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The current round of European Union enlargement is a development of truly 
historic proportions.2 In quantitative terms, if enlargement proceeds to all ten 
candidates, the area of the Union would be enlarged by about one-third whereas 
its population would increase by 29 percent. Qualitatively, the accession of the 
countries of East-Central Europe would dramatically alter the political map of 
Europe as it has been for the last five decades and it would put a seal on the 
reunification of the two sides of Europe initiated by the raising of the Iron 
Curtain in 1989. This paper investigates the geostrategic implications of this 
radical change, concentrating on three major issues: the effect of enlargement 
on the Union as an international actor, its likely impact on the world stage (and 
in particular on the global institutional network), and the political prospects of 
an enlarged Union with its neighbours to the East and South.
The long-term effects of enlargement are considered generally to be 
positive, both for the Union itself and for its role as an international actor. Once 
the processes of institutional reform and enlargement are digested, the European 
Union will become a stronger and more confident member of the international 
community, offering security to its neighbours and contributing effectively to 
the maintenance of the open world economy. In the short term, however, 
enlargement will create problems of adjustment. These problems cannot be 
avoided because enlargement represented a reaction to unexpected changes in 
Eastern Europe rather than a preconceived product of political engineering. The 
historic mission of European Union is to contribute to stability and peace 
through integration. Therefore, after the events of 1989 there was no real 
alternative to eastward enlargement. Nevertheless, the process has been slow, 
although given the heterogeneity between the EU and Eastern Europe, it is 
actually quite remarkable that a policy on enlargement was finally adopted at 
the June 1993 European Council in Copenhagen and initiated after the 1997 
Intergovernmental Conference. The difficulties of enlarging the Union - which 
is both federal and intergovernmental - are especially daunting because 
attention is and will be focused primarily on EMU for at least the next two 
years. Public support for enlargement is thus lukewarm given the costs and risks 
that it entails. But this paper argues that nevertheless, EU enlargement is likely 
to provide the best guarantee for continental stability. Through the expansion of 
the acquis and the formal and informal rules of the Union secular divisions 
between East and West will be overcome.
2 Previous enlargements were: in 1973 to the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark; in 1981 




























































































Enlargement could produce some problems in the short term for the 
establishment and functioning of an effective CFSP. Difficulties emerge from 
the increased heterogeneity of the Union and because some EU resources will 
need to be redistributed for the task of integrating the weaker economies of the 
new Member States. Enlarging too slowly would keep the question of the final 
borders of the Union open. Enlarging too quickly carries the risk of - to use Paul 
Kennedy's term - “overstretching” the Union. Furthermore, the expansion of the 
European Union will close the gap between the EUs borders with Russia and 
Turkey, thereby stressing the importance of maintaining good bilateral relations 
with those countries. Nevertheless, enlargement will eventually produce a larger 
and stronger Union capable of mobilising resources for a global policy, since 
most of the Old Continent's problems will be settled because enlargement is in 
itself a foreign policy tool. This change will be reflected especially in the 
Union's role within other international institutions. Furthermore, the Union 
cannot afford to ignore its relations with the United States and the 
Mediterranean - which also remain crucially important. Other policy initiatives 
vis-à-vis the Lomé countries, Latin America, and ASEAN will also compel the 
Union to take up an increasingly important role on the world stage.
The Effects of the Enlargement Process on the European Union
At the present time ten East-Central European (ECE) countries plus Cyprus are 
being considered for EU membership. Turkey hoped to be included in the same 
group, but the decision of the December 1997 European Council in 
Luxembourg has frustrated these ambitions, and Turkey is currently reassessing 
its relations with the EU. Clearly, even partial enlargement will affect the EU 
dramatically (see Table 1). EU citizenship will grow by 100 to 200 million, 
depending on which countries are eventually admitted. In the long term, this 
will certainly strengthen the Union, which would become the most developed 
economic actor in the world with a market of more than 450 million consumers. 
In general terms, a stronger Union will be obliged to assume a leading role in 
international politics and the global economy. It is in the interests of the EU, 
therefore, to maintain a stable and open international system. Not only would a 
stronger Union have a greater incentive to keep other economies open to its 
goods and services, but the nature of most of the candidate countries - small, 





























































































Table 1. Countries involved in the Enlargement Process
Country GDP per head. Population, Date of Application
$ at PPP, 1996 Millions
European Union (15) 19.250 372,5
Cyprus 11.989 0,7 July 1990
Czech Republic 9.479 10,3 January 1996
Estonia 4.431 1,5 November 1995
Hungary 6.410 10,1 March 1994
Poland 5.400 38,6 April 1994
Slovenia 11.113 1,9 June 1996
Bulgaria 4.190 8,5 December 1995
Latvia 3.484 2,5 October 1995
Lithuania 4.273 3,7 December 1995
Romania 4.591 22,7 June 1995
Slovakia 7.970 5,3 June 1995
Turkey 6.103 60,8 April 1987
Enlargement will also facilitate the process of developing a complex and 
competitive economy characterised by heterogeneous modes of production. The 
other large geoeconomic areas of the world - North America and East Asia - 
already enjoy economies of scale and the advantages of coupling strong, 
technologically advanced economies (the United States and Japan) with 
countries offering low labour costs, high returns on investments, and other 
prerequisites for double-digit growth. The obvious advantages to the newly- 
admitted Member States, including foreign investments and technology sharing, 
are balanced by the increased competitiveness of the European market. 
European firms would benefit greatly from better combination of production 
factors and the advantages of increased trade.
While the long-term benefits from an enlarged Union seem clear, the 
short and medium term consequences are less transparent. Uncertainty can be 
grouped into three categories: 1) problems linked to the process of enlargement 
itself, 2) the need to reform EU institutions, and 3) the question of the 
development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
First, the process of enlargement has been defined by the Union's guiding 
principles in general and by the decisions of the Council in particular. The 1993 
Copenhagen Summit created a framework for EU enlargement by spelling out 
the principle of conditionality based on three crucial requirements for accession: 
the development of democracy (with emphasis on human and minority rights), 




























































































capacity to implement the acquis communitaire. These requirements originated 
from the Union’s integrationist agenda, in which first pillar considerations are 
paramount and which requires the fulfilment of the conditions for accession. 
Although these standards can be kept quite flexible, conditionality necessarily 
implies an enlargement in stages, since it is unrealistic to expect all applicants 
to fulfil the criteria simultaneously. Thus, prompted by the 1995 Madrid 
Summit, the Commission’s Agenda 2000 envisages differentiation; in early 
1998, negotiations will begin with five applicant countries (Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Estonia plus Cyprus), while negotiations with 
the other five (Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia) will 
commence at a later stage.3 The Luxembourg Summit slightly modified the 
original proposal by setting a March 30, 1998 start date for the enlargement 
process including all 11 countries, though confirming that negotiations will 
begin earlier with those countries that are closest to fulfilling the entrance 
criteria.
This slow and cumbersome process - as compared with the quick pace of 
NATO enlargement - is a result of the First Pillar enlargement policy, which 
requires that complex and stringent standards be applied to acceding countries. 
Complexity and incrementalism characterise the very nature of the enlargement 
negotiations, in which a certain degree of uncertainty maximises EU leverage. 
Negotiations are no guarantee of accession. The EU has avoided setting a 
precise timetable for enlargement, since it would remove incentives for driving 
reforms in first and second round applicant countries.4 However, the cost of this 
leverage is increased risk to the enlargement process. By maximising 
uncertainty, the EU may alienate some of its applicants: “The great length and 
staccato nature of the process will also create an environment of perpetual 
uncertainty, possibly counterbalanced by the discipline exerted on the candidate 
states through the fear of exclusion”.5
In order to mitigate the divisive and frustrating aspects of the enlargement 
in stages policy, the Commission has also formulated a pre-accession strategy, 
as recommended by the 1994 Essen Council. This strategy involves all 
accession countries irrespective of their application status. First, aid to non-
3 EC Commission, Agenda 2000, COM (97) 2000 final, 15 July 1997, pp. 57-59.
4 Heather Grabbe and Kirsty Hughes, Eastward Enlargement o f the European Union, Royal 
Institute for International Affairs, 1996, p. 56.
5 Christopher Hill, The Geostrategic Implications o f Enlargement, paper delivered at the 
Second Meeting of the EUI Robert Schuman Centre’s Working Group on the Eastern 




























































































members will be substantially increased targeting institution building and 
improvements to the administration and infrastructure. Although the EU usually 
uses Structural Funds for these purposes, applicant countries are in the 
paradoxical position that they must increase their wealth first in order to qualify 
as “less developed” by Community Structural Funds standards.6 Therefore, 
these reforms will be financed instead by the Phare programme. Next, the 
Luxembourg European Council has formulated a single enlargement framework 
which will commence with a Ministerial Conference including all applicant 
countries. In addition, a European Conference (sometimes referred to as the 
“family photo”), to which Turkey will be invited as a state with the intention of 
joining, will be organised to discuss non-First Pillar intergovernmental issues.7
Second, enlargement will create a Union of 25 or more Member States, 
which will not be able to operate under the same institutions as a Community of 
six or even 15. As addressed in the Amsterdam Treaty and the Agenda 2000, the 
number of commissioners, the criteria for their selection, and general voting 
procedures will need to be amended before the end of the century. Otherwise, 
the Commission may become too large to be efficient, or voting majorities may 
be such that they exclude the most important states.8 Institutional changes of 
this sort, however, are difficult, costly, and often trigger discord along national 
lines. But there is not necessarily a contradiction between the Union's two goals 
of widening and deepening. Previous rounds of enlargement have not hindered 
important steps, such as the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty, 
despite the fact that some of the new members were not enthusiastic about 
integration. Thus, enlargement could actually supply the pressure needed to 
initiate institutional restructuring and strengthening EU policies. For example, 
problems in applicant countries related to the environment or crime may 
redefine the understanding of “security” and the solutions to these problems 
will enhance cooperation in these sectors between current Member States and 
EU applicant countries.
Third, even if enlargement does not weaken its institutions, it may limit 
the EU’s ability to be effective outside EU borders through CFSP.9 Enlargement
6 EC Commission, Agenda 2000, p. 52.
7 EC Commission, Agenda 2000, p. 55.
8 Similarly, the rules for the presidency will have to be reformed because Member State’s 
presidency terms would be too far apart to maintain continuity and there is a possibility that 
troikas would be created by small countries (for example Latvia, Lithuania and Luxembourg) 
that individually do not have sufficient administrative clout.




























































































is a “foreign and security policy” in the sense that the prospect of admitting and 
the eventual accession of ECE countries into the EU may help resolve age-old 
conflicts such as those which once plagued Western Europe. At the same time, 
enlargement would also increase the variety of views on what the EU’s external 
role should be. The major obstacle to the formation of a common policy in the 
former Yugoslavia was precisely the heterogeneity of perceptions of and 
responses to the crisis.10 1If precautions are not taken, at least two negative 
consequences of increased heterogeneity may accompany enlargement. One 
effect may be that the Union will pivot its geopolitical interests to the East. By 
focusing its attention on EU relations with Russia and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, the EU Mediterranean policy and other important global 
concerns may be ignored. Alternatively, the Union could de facto abandon the 
pursuit of a common policy and fragment its actions in a variety of individual or 
small-group responses, abusing the principle of flexibility. Whatever the 
outcome, the effectiveness of European CFSP is likely to be jeopardised. The 
danger of EU’s greater heterogeneity is compounded by the expectations that 
the EU will take a leading role in global politics." In fact, it does not 
necessarily follow that a larger EU will automatically become more 
internationally assertive, since increasing complexity may actually result in an 
EU focused on internal, rather than external, issues. Only when these problems 
are addressed and when the political views of the Member States are more 
homogeneous, will the Union be able to take full advantage of the enlargement 
process.
A n Enlarged U nion in the Global System
Eventually, the problems with CFSP will become easier to solve because the 
EU's borders are unlikely to remain uncertain forever. Keeping the borders of 
the EU open indefinitely is both undesirable and unrealistic. Once the final 
shape of the Union is determined, cohesion will gradually develop without the 
shocks and distractions connected with the enlargement process. In the 
foreseeable future, the size of the Union is likely to be limited to the 10 ECE 
countries plus Cyprus. Nevertheless, future enlargements should not be ruled 
out completely because the criteria for accession are quite objective and do not
10 Filippo Andreatta, The Bosnian War and the New World Order: Failure and Success of 
International Intervention, occasional paper, WEU Institute for Security Studies, 1996.
11 Christopher Hill, “The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s 




























































































include cultural or religious prejudices, such as those implied by the “Clash of 
Civilisations” argument. More importantly, in the short term however, is the 
type of entity that the enlarged European Union will become. Its geopolitical 
role will depend on whether it will maintain its character as an open and 
peaceful “civilian power” or whether it becomes perceived as a closed, 
exclusive, and potentially hostile club by non-member states. In the following 
sections, the likely effects of EU enlargement on the primary international 
actors will be analysed individually. But the general answer is that a larger 
Europe will continue to be seen as an element of stability and reassurance, 
though in some instances it may be perceived as a power that needs to be 
counterbalanced.
It is therefore not as important to limit the eventual shape of the Union 
(which in the medium term is restricted to the ten CEC countries plus Cyprus) 
as to define the EU’s new relationship with areas outside the Union. In other 
words, it is crucial to determine whether the Union's borders and CFSP policies 
will be sharp or fuzzy, “by which is meant a condition of ambiguity resulting 
from some insiders having opted out from some common CFSP activities and 
some outsiders being ever more closely associated with what the EU does”.12 
This is even more important since an enlarged Union will share borders with 
important actors such as Russia and Turkey. As direct contact between the EU 
and these countries increases, EU interaction with NATO enlargement will also 
be affected.
With respect to Russia, NATO enlargement has complemented EU 
interests by defusing Russia’s security concerns over EU enlargement, as 
demonstrated by Moscow's acquiescence with EU’s inclusion of Estonia in the 
first round of enlargement. Security concerns that arise in the future will be 
handled by the newly created NATO-Russia Council. Therefore security will 
not be prominent on the EU agenda for the time being and will allow the EU to 
maintain its non-threatening image. But the EU’s simultaneous participation in 
multilateral institutions - such as the OSCE - and common projects would 
diminish the perception of the EU as a unified bloc. It is in this light that the 
ideas of a European Conference and of free trade areas, including Russia or the 
Mediterranean countries, must be seen. A multi-layered Europe, in which all 
countries are involved at least in some common institutions and policies, would 
be beneficial to a larger Union and dispel any negative consequences of EU 
enlargement in the other major international actors. Without these horizontal 
links, EU enlargement might create vertical divisions between EU and non-EU 
states, which would be perceived as a jolt to the continental power equilibrium.




























































































The question of the EU's place in international institutions is likely to be 
a crucial test for its role in international politics. Therefore, the effects of 
enlargement are likely to be different depending on whether the issue is 
addressed by a common policy or intergovernmental cooperation. The effect of 
EU enlargement on common policies, such as with the World Trade 
Organisation, will be directly proportional to the Union’s strength. In the case 
of intergovernmental cooperation, a larger Union may experience coordination 
problems, at least in the short term, similar to those affecting CFSP. In other 
words, the Union’s ability to transform increased size into greater influence will 
depend on its willingness and ability to speak with one voice - the difficulties of 
which were evident in the task of formulating a common proposal for United 
Nations Security Council reform. Finally, a third category arises from those 
institutions in which European involvement predates European integration. For 
example, despite the fact that EU Member States make up one-third of all 
International Monetary Fund members, Europe's power has been limited 
because of discord between the Member States. The emergence of an economic 
and monetary union should radically change this situation, by increasing 
European influence pari passu through the establishment of the Euro as a global 
currency.
In substantive terms, enlargement may also lead to a long-term change in 
the EU’s geopolitical aims due to the increased prominence of its global role. 
First, enlargement would put a seal on the Cold War legacy of division and 
confrontation, allowing it to concentrate on wider issues. Second, the Union's 
larger economic base will complement the process of globalisation through 
greater contact with global markets. For example, the EU is playing an 
increasingly larger role in UN Conferences on Global Warming. Similarly, EU 
trade with Asia has more than doubled since 1988, growing at a faster rate than 
Asian trade with the United States. It is in this light that the new EU policy on 
Asia must be seen, as epitomised by the EU-ASEM meeting in Bangkok in 
1996.
Finally, there is the issue of policy orientation of international institutions 
that depend on transatlantic relations, either informally or within the framework 
of the Atlantic Alliance or G-8. After all, it is around the Euro-American axis 
that most decisions hinge. Enlargement has been encouraged by Washington 
and it is therefore likely to have a positive effect on EU-US relations. However, 
the US will expect a larger and stronger Europe to “share more of the burden” 
of providing international public goods, contributing to the capabilities- 
expectations gap referred to earlier. In general terms, a larger and stronger 



























































































a change in the transatlantic relationship. A more symmetrical relationship 
between the two sides of the Atlantic requires a change in the current situation 
in which American leadership is the focal point of Western international 
policies. Already we have witnessed some effects of the changing relationship. 
In the field of security, in which American leadership through NATO is clear, 
the transatlantic relationship has become smoother over the last few years. 
However in the economic realm, in which Europe is relatively stronger and 
more united, several disputes have emerged over the extraterritorial reach of 
American sanctions, audio-visual products, the future of the civil airplane 
industry, to name a few, which stem from the fact that neither side readily 
recognises the leadership of the other. In a modern world in which economics 
has become increasingly more important, it is necessary that the new EU-US 
relationship will address trade and financial issues more directly.
The Effects of Enlargement on the Union's N eighbours
Despite its importance in a global context, the most direct impact of EU 
enlargement will be on the neighbours of the EU. It is mainly on this count that 
the geopolitical consequences of enlargement must be assessed. This final 
section will therefore address the likely consequences of accession for four 
groups of countries: the East-Central Europe, Russia and the former Soviet 
Union, Turkey, and the Mediterranean.
(i) East-Central Europe
Although this area is the beneficiary of EU enlargement, the negotiations will 
be conducted on a strictly bilateral basis and, given the principle of 
conditionality, the ensuing differentiation will separate “pre-ins” (countries 
excluded from the first round of negotiations) and first-round countries. The 
main concern is that enlargement does not create new divisions in Europe, 
which would undermine the goal of integration. Some countries may feel 
alienated by being placed in the pre-in category. If these countries perceive this 
as rejection, they may choose to slow down reforms. Furthermore, they may 
perceive enlargement in stages as preferential treatment. The admission of a 
country into the EU may exacerbate relations with its neighbours if they 
perceive that EU membership gives the country in question a significant 
advantage in their negotiations (e.g., Hungary, Cyprus). The EU has therefore 
devised a pre-accession strategy that involves all the accession countries. The 
establishment of the Single Framework, the European Conference, as well as 




























































































enlargement process, removing the risk that the first round will undermine the 
second round.
A related aspect is the issue of sub-regional cooperation. After 1989, it 
was believed that regional integration, such as the Central European Initiative 
(initially called Pentagonale), the Visegrad Initiative, the Black Sea 
Cooperation Council, the Baltic Cooperation Council, and the Commonwealth 
of Independent States, could respond to the need for integrating at the regional 
level as well as prepare the ECE countries for eventual admission to the EU. 
Although the success of these initiatives varies (Visegrad and Baltic 
cooperation were relatively successful, while the Black Sea Cooperation 
Council and the CIS failed), overall they did not prove effective. Sub-regional 
cooperation, however, is not incompatible with European integration and the 
two couj^'well proceed on parallel tracks, as demonstrated by the success of the 
Be-Ne^Lux integration process. Sub-regional cooperation should be encouraged 
because of its ability to reduce political and economic barriers and to attract 
investment. Nevertheless, the EU should not expected that such cooperation can 
replace an effective enlargement policy. One possible approach might be to link 
various organisations together, creating an area of cooperation spanning from 
the Baltic to the Black Sea, including CEFTA and Ukraine.
(ii) Russia
Russia has so far favoured EU enlargement, both because it has traditionally 
perceived the Union as a civilian power and a crucial partner and because 
Moscow itself has developed a less confrontational policy with the West. 
Therefore, the prospect of Estonian membership has not triggered a hostile 
reaction, in stark contrast with the negative stance taken on NATO enlargement. 
It is essential for the EU to strengthen relations with Russia, given the country’s 
enormous importance, the imminent EU-Russia border, the presence of 500,000 
ethnic Russians in the Baltic Republics, and Moscow's close economic and 
cultural relations with the applicant countries (some of which heavily rely on 
Russian energy). In this respect, there is no reason to doubt that a constructive 
relationship is a priority. Although direct Russian political influence on the area 
will probably decrease, Russia will continue to gain access to the European 
market, thereby strengthening the geoeconomic ties between Russia and the EU.
EU relations with Ukraine and Belarus, which are perceived by Moscow 




























































































developments in Russia”.13 It is possible that EU enlargement may in fact spur 
greater efforts to reintegrate the former Soviet states. Although “sphere-of- 
influence” and annexation policies should be resolutely resisted, the problem of 
organising the area between the EU and the Russian Federation must be 
resolved. Offering EU accession to these countries may potentially 
“overstretch” the capacity of the EU, and in any case, meeting the Copenhagen 
criteria seems too be an impossible goal in these ex-Soviet republics (contrary 
to the three Baltic States). Given its size, resources, and key geopolitical 
location, Ukraine is unique, which means that the EU will need to establish a 
special relationship with this country.14 Since the CIS has become a dead letter, 
the need to deal with this region and remains on the EU agenda, and awaits a 
creative solution.
(iii) Turkey
Turkey is somewhat similar to the Russian case: Both are large countries with 
heterogeneous cultures; both lie strategically on the bridge between Europe and 
Asia; and both are tom between pro-European and nationalistic sentiments. 
Turkey also poses special problems, given its determination to apply for EU 
membership since 1964. On the one hand, Turkey's accession would represent a 
Herculean task because of the country’s distinctive culture - which would 
involve problems in the full adoption of the acquis - and because of its sheer 
size. According to current projections, Turkey’s population will soon surpass 
that of any individual Member State, thus creating problems with the free- 
circulation of people. Furthermore, Turkey's geopolitical position also raises 
peculiar issues given its borders with Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the Caucuses. On the 
other hand, an outright rejection could provoke the clearest division between 
Europe and the Islamic region since the Ottoman Empire in the XVII century, 
not to mention exposing the Union to the charges that its conditional answers 
since 1964 have been insincere and that the EU is religiously and ethnically 
biased. It is therefore imperative that the principle of conditionality be applied 
without prejudice. Turkey, as all other applicants, must be required to meet the 
Copenhagen criteria in both economic and political terms. In the meantime, 
given the impossibility of early accession, the EU should continue its policy of 
engagement and association, building on the Customs’ Union. The Luxembourg 
Summit has postponed enlargement negotiations with Ankara and, despite the
13 Antoni Kaminski, The Geostrategic Implications o f Enlargement, paper delivered at the 
Second Meeting of the EUI Robert Schuman Centre’s Working Group on the Eastern 
Enlargement of the European Union, Brussels, October 1997, p. 1.




























































































fact that it has offered to elaborate a pre-accession strategy, it has provoked an 
immediate and piercing reaction from Turkey, threatening the long-term EU- 
Turkish relationship.
The EU-Turkey relationship is exacerbated by the issue of Cyprus, which 
has the potential to escalate into a serious crisis. The Union's strategy (after the 
1995 Corfu decision) to begin accession talks with Nicosia aims at using the 
accession negotiations of the de jure republic as a means to overcome the de 
facto partition, by stimulating the formation of a joint diplomatic team including 
both ethnic groups. However, the Union's leverage is limited because restricting 
EU entry to the Greek side will alienate Turkey. This may subsequently catalyse 
the permanent separation of the two sides if Turkey annexes the northern part. 
However, waiting for prior unification through confederation could either 
indefinitely postpone the island's entry or give Ankara leverage in internal EU 
affairs. Thus “the EU is really damned if it does and damned if it doesn't”.15
(iv) The Mediterranean
While there is a certain ambiguity on the eventual borders of the Union to the 
East and to the Southeast, the Mediterranean Sea constitutes a clear demarcation 
line to the South, as is testified by the negative fate of Morocco's application. 
Enlargement is therefore not an option to solve the “security vacuum” in the 
region and will therefore concentrate mainly on the 10 ECE countries.16 
However, some of the most serious threats to European civilisation - from mass 
migrations to environmental disasters, from terrorism to nuclear proliferation - 
originate from the Southern shore of the basin. Also, Europe's foreign policy 
attention will therefore be increasingly shifted to the Mediterranean because 
after enlargement most of the European problems hopefully will be settled as 
internal questions. It is therefore essential that the Barcelona process and the 
Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area project (initiated by the bilateral 
agreements with Morocco and Tunisia in 1995) continue with renewed urgency. 
The aim of the Union's policy should eventually be to achieve in the 
neighbouring areas what enlargement is achieving in Europe itself.
15 Hill, op. cit.





























































































The long-term effects of enlargement on the international political and 
economic role of the EU are considered to be positive. Once enlargement is 
digested, the EU will become a stronger member of the international 
community, capable of mobilising greater resources for a global policy, offering 
a stable relationship to its neighbours and contributing effectively to the 
maintenance of the open world economy. In the short term, however, the EU 
enlargement may weaken its institutions, political cohesion, and the 
development of an effective Common Foreign and Security Policy.
Enlarging the EU by 10 Central and Eastern European Countries and 
Cyprus will preserve its character as an open and peaceful “civilian power.” The 
EU will therefore be in a position to develop and constructively strengthen 
relationships with its neighbours in Europe by taking continent-wide political 
initiatives. Such initiatives would include establishing a Free Trade Area to 
include Russia and Mediterranean countries, and participating in multilateral 
organisations in Europe, such as the OSCE. An enlarged EU will be better 
prepared for the process of globalisation because of its larger and more 
diversified economic base. A larger and stronger EU will lead to a more equal 
partnership in transatlantic relations, although the US will expect the EU to 
“share more of the burden.” The EU’s role in international institutions will grow 
proportionally to its enlargement in institutions where issues of common 
policies are dealt with, such as in the WTO and the IMF, after the introduction 
of the Euro. In other institutions the EU will only be capable of transforming 
increased size into greater influence if it is willing and able to speak with one 
voice.
EU enlargement will have the greatest impact on its neighbours. Eastward 
enlargement will happen in stages, but new divisions in Europe should be 
prevented. The EU has therefore devised a pre-accession strategy involving all 
the accession countries - Central and Eastern Europe - in a single framework. 
Regional cooperation in the area (Visegrad and Baltic cooperation) should be 
encouraged because it prepares political and economic integration. 
Nevertheless, regional cooperation cannot replace an effective EU enlargement 
policy.
It is essential for the EU to strengthen relations with Russia, which 
remains a crucial political and economic partner on the continent. EU relations 




























































































Russia. Special relations with Ukraine must take into account its size and 
importance.
Regarding Turkey, the EU should continue its policy of engagement and 
deepening of the Association relationship building on the Customs Union. 
Turkey as a European State has the intention to join the EU, but poses special 
problems which do not allow for Turkey’s inclusion into the accession process 
at the present time. In addition, the EU-Turkey relationship is exacerbated by 
the issue of Cyprus.
As southern neighbours to the EU, the Mediterranean countries need 
Europe’s support to combat the problems in the region. It is therefore essential 
that the Barcelona process and the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area project 
are pursued vigorously to achieve in this area what EU enlargement hopes to 
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